In psychiatry numbers of interpretation-procedures are used, which all confine themselves to their own scheme of conceptions. This is demonstrated by the example of comparing lanet's and Freud's explanation of the phenomenon 'déjàvu'. The former's interpretation follows natural-science or logical-empiricisme, the latter's on the contrary is individualistic-psychological.
As a representative of a third procedure we can take Foudraine, who in his book 'Who is of wood' comes to a social-psychological explanation. Certainly more opinions are possibly about the ways of interpreting, which unfortunately lead to senseless critiques among their followers. The arguments, of ten really right in themselves, don't hold water, because of the tact that only that is considered as valuable, which fits in the own way of explaining. This sort of critique is also senseless because the human subjectivity, pre-eminently the field of psychiatry, cannot lend itself for scientific argumentation. Here the point is always defending values instead of truths. One question pertains to objective science only, namely the truth or the untruth of an allegation.
Psychiatry can pretend to be objectiv in a limited way and can put only a small part of her patients succesfully in the field of clinical medicine. This does not alter the necessity of a medical psychology, which tends to objectify sub jectiv phenomenons, which means incorporating them in a consistence scheme of con285 ceptions. For this to little attention is paid to the works of the french psychiatrist Pierre Janet.
In psychiatric practice the medical model and the system of somatic medicine are of ten anti-psychotherapeutic. Psychiatry therefore facing the task to develop other attitudes and procedures of interpretation and to build them up to independent disciplines, so that in the future distribution and coéirdination of tasks will be effectuated.